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A Polarizing Dynamic by Center Cabinets?  
The Mechanism of Limited Contestation  
Johannes Schmitt & Simon T. Franzmann ∗ 
Abstract: »Eine polarisierende Wirkung von Zentrumskabinetten? Der Mecha-
nismus der eingeschränkten Konkurrenz«. What effect does the presence of a 
coalition of the ideological center have on polarization in party systems? Stud-
ies of party positioning demonstrate the impact of a party’s affiliation to the 
cabinet for its electoral campaigning. In addition, comparative studies of party 
systems analyzed the effects of the competitive situation between the coalition 
and the opposition on party competition dynamics. Nevertheless, the linkage 
between findings of both branches of literature is still missing. On the one 
hand, studies of party competition models generally focus on explaining party 
behavior and do not aggregate these insights. On the other hand, party system 
studies usually lack an analytical micro-foundation. Thus, we do not know the 
mechanism that drives a polity to the extreme. To find this missing link, we de-
rive two potential explanations based on the spatial theory of party competi-
tion and Satori’s study of party systems: incumbent punishment and limited 
contestation. We elaborate these mechanisms with the help of an agent-based 
model. Then, we trace the effect of cabinet type back to the limited contesta-
tion between coalition parties. If the incumbent parties avoid contestation with 
each other, a center cabinet induces polarizing dynamics since the opposition 
then has no incentive for responsible office-seeking. Specific circumstances 
such as a polarized electorate and voters’ negative evaluation of the cabinet 
parties support this mechanism. Methodologically, our simulation study reveals 
three advantages of the agent-based modeling approach: (1) the uncovering of 
thus far implicit assumptions; (2) the possibility of analyzing causal dependen-
cies within a complex and dynamic model; and (3) the precision of our theoret-
ical expectations based on the micro-foundation. 
Keywords: Party competition, party system polarization, agent-based modeling, 
polarized pluralism. 
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1. Introduction1  
What impact has the competitive situation between government and opposition 
on party system polarization? What kind of government-opposition structure, 
e.g. a center vs. a wing cabinet, leads to a centripetal dynamic and when does a 
polarizing momentum arise? Many studies on party competition taught us the 
importance of party’s affiliation to the cabinet for its electoral campaigning 
and, in consequence, for their positioning along the competitive dimension 
(Fagerholm 2016, 505; Meyer 2013). Moreover, comparative studies also show 
us the effect of different competitive situations on polarizing dynamics in party 
systems (Curini and Hino 2012; Schmitt and Franzmann 2017a; Sartori 1976). 
Nevertheless, there is a missing link between findings of party competition 
models and studies of party systems. In recent years, political science literature 
has made major advances in explaining the positioning of parties (Adams 2012; 
Fagerholm 2016). However, this branch concentrates rather on the behavior of 
single actors. Consequently, the aggregation of these patterns of party behavior 
to the system level is rarely the point of interest. On the contrary, comparative 
studies of party system polarization usually focus on macro-level patterns 
without an explicit derivation of actor-based explanations (e.g. Sartori 1976; 
Powell 2015). 
For this reason, our explanation of polarization dynamics based on actors’ 
behavior is, so far, incomplete and we are confronted with a so-called ‘black-
box.’ There are two different branches of literature whose findings have not 
been linked to each other yet. Our article, at least partially, fills this gap by 
relying on an agent based model (ABM). We argue that this method is an ap-
propriate tool to connect macro-level dependencies with micro- (or meso-) 
level mechanisms. Therefore, we are able to link both branches of literature.  
For this purpose, we integrate findings of party competition models in the 
tradition of the spatial theory (Downs 1957) and considerations of Giovanni 
Sartori into our model. Sartori had fundamental ideas on the macro-level dy-
namics of party systems. His typology is still an essential innovation in the 
research area of party systems (Mair 1997, 206; Evans 2002), but neglects to 
identify clear mechanisms of micro-level party behavior. We demonstrate how 
ABM is able to combine the strength of the modern micro-level oriented empir-
ical explanations with the classical literature on party system types.  
                                                             
1  We are grateful to the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 
DFG) for funding this work (project title: “The influence of opposition in established democ-
racies”; project number: 290380518). Furthermore, we would like to thank the participants 
and organizers of the workshop “Agent-Based Modelling across Social Science, Economics, 
and Philosophy” for their helpful comments and suggestions. Last but not least, we also 
thank Simon Miksch, Oliver Rittman, and Anna Halstenbach for their beneficial assistance in 
editing this article. 
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The aggregation of individual party positioning to party system polarization 
is of great interest to explain party system stability and representation. General-
ly speaking, polarization indicates the level of diverging opinions within a 
party system or a political system. The more there are diverging opinions, the 
more difficult it is to find a majority (Schmitt and Franzmann 2017b, 3). Polar-
ization put to its extremes threatens the function of a political system as a 
whole (Sartori 1976), while a moderate increase might have a positive impact 
on voter turnout (Dalton 2008). In this article, we are rather interested in party 
system mechanisms. 
Three potential advantages of ABM become visible: (1) So far, the formal 
modeling approach has revealed the implicit assumptions and axioms of the 
verbal theory. As a necessity of an ABM’s application, all theoretical argu-
ments are explicitly formulated and the intersubjective traceability of the theory 
increases. (2) Based on an ABM, it is possible to analyze causal dependencies 
and links between analytical levels within a dynamic multi-level model. There-
fore, we can test whether a mechanism on the party or voter level explains the 
impact of a center coalition. This analysis ensures the logical consistency of 
our theoretical argumentation even though the theoretical model becomes com-
plex. In addition, the comprehensibility of ABMs is possible because of their 
realization in an established programming environment (Wilensky 1999). In-
terested researchers can easily understand and manipulate a model’s properties. 
Therefore, in our opinions, ABMs are better accessible than comparable math-
ematical models. (3) And lastly, we adjust our empirical expectations based on 
theory. Hence, we can formulate empirically, testable hypotheses in a more 
sophisticated way than before. In particular, the conditions for the influence of 
center cabinets are made visible. We illustrate the crucial change in evaluating 
empirical patterns, which became visible by using ABMs. This advantage 
might be the most concrete one regarding a theory-testing research design 
because of its critical impact on empirical analyses. 
We start by discussing current literature on party system positioning and po-
larization. Based on these models of party competition and Sartori’s typology, 
we outline our theoretical model. The central explaining mechanisms we iden-
tify are (1) the limited contestation between coalition partners and (2) voters’ 
tendency to punish incumbents in the case of dissatisfaction with the govern-
ment. Then we develop the ABM in detail. Finally, we analyze a sample of 
runs of the model both. The results of the ABM provide essential information 
about the theoretical framework. We show that there is no simple, linear rela-
tionship between cabinet-opposition patterns and polarization. A coalition of 
the ideological center only affects the competition dynamic under specific 
circumstances and the ABM significantly expands our knowledge about these 
dependencies. Based on the simulation results, we argue that a center cabinet is 
an insufficient but necessary part of a condition, which is itself unnecessary but 
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sufficient (or an INUS condition; Mackie 1965) for the occurrence of a polariz-
ing dynamic in party competition.  
2. Party Positioning and Party System Polarization 
In the tradition of the spatial theory, party positioning is explained by two 
fundamental assumptions in its simplest form (Downs 1957): parties try to 
maximize their votes and voters vote for the party that represents their policy 
preferences best. Furthermore, the reducibility of policy preferences to one 
dimension is usually surmised. Regarding a two-party competition, we would 
assume a party positioning around the median voter based on this model. Of 
course, the so-called median-voter theorem does not hold true in empirical 
studies (for a review Martin 2009, 47-9). However, this original model initiates 
a great number of further developments and follow-up studies. These innova-
tions provide the starting point of our analysis. The original model of Downs 
denies any influence of the cabinet type (or something like that) on the compe-
tition dynamics. However, the findings and model modifications of the follow-
ing studies give us potential hints to the mechanism we are looking for. In spite 
of the many insights of the party positioning literature the impact of the com-
petitive situation between government and opposition on party system polariza-
tion is still unexplained. In the following, we discuss the branches of the litera-
ture of party competition studies. Building on this, we have identified at least 
seven major modifications on Downs’ basic model. 
First, scholars doubt that positions on all issues are disputed in party compe-
tition (Stokes 1963). They stress the importance of issues in which parties share 
the same goal. Parties rather compete for being perceived as the most compe-
tent one. Stokes (1963) labeled those issues as “valence issues.” Because all 
parties hold the same position, voters cannot decide on policy-oriented consid-
erations. Already Downs (1957, 50) stressed the importance of the government 
record for the voting decision, but the overall idea of a competition on compe-
tence is not part of his study.  
Second, political parties do not follow a strict vote-seeking strategy. At 
least, parties’ calculus comprises simultaneously vote-, policy-, and office-
seeking (Strøm 1990). Agent-based models have already shown that the pursu-
ing of different goals influences parties’ willingness to compromise and, in 
consequences, has an effect on the competition dynamic (Franzmann and 
Schmitt 2016). 
Third, parties might not act in the same policy spaces. The work of Robert-
son (1976) prepared the later development of the salience theory of party com-
petition. Here, we assume that parties selectively emphasize different issues, 
instead of competing each other along position issues. Furthermore, parties can 
own specific issues. This consideration reflects the idea of valence issues 
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(Budge and Farlie 1983; Budge 2001; Budge 2015). Relying on this idea, 
Budge (1994) proposes in his “new spatial theory of party competition” five 
models of party positioning. In contrast to Downs, Budge (1994, 461) does not 
assume that parties are simply vote-maximizers. Depending on the competitive 
situation, they react, for example, to past electoral results, alter their position 
based on their leadership or try to hold distance to their ideological rivals. This 
study inspired a lot of work on party positioning (Adams 2012; Fagerholm 
2015). For instance, Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) observe that parties move 
into the direction of a rival party that has successfully moved in the election 
before.  
The fourth modification focuses on the difference between mainstream and 
niche parties. Niche parties are not keen on moving towards the center. They 
are sensitive to shifts in the median policy position of their voters but do not 
systematically respond to the median voter position in the general electorate 
(Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2008; Ezrow et al. 2010).  
Fifth, the assumption of a party as a unitary actor is abandoned. Focusing on 
the internal organization, Meyer (2013) shows that parties with strong organi-
zations can more easily change their policy positions. Furthermore, the greater 
the power of party members compared to the party leadership, the less likely 
are position and issue changes (Schumacher et al. 2013; Hennl and Franzmann 
2017).  
Sixth, the government and opposition status have an impact on party behav-
ior. Meyer (2013) and Schumacher et al. (2013) demonstrate that left-right 
policy change is easier for parties in government. In contrast, Hennl and 
Franzmann (2017) show that issue salience change is easier for parties in oppo-
sition. However, these studies do not question whether the cabinet type modi-
fies incentives for changing party positions.  
Seventh, ABMs of party competition are developed to model dynamics of 
multi-party systems (Laver 2005; Laver and Sergenti 2012; Fowler and Laver 
2008). In these models, parties act as adaptive actors and different party strate-
gies are implemented. In addition, researches use computational methods to 
model various, complex assumptions. For example, Smirnov and Fowler 
(2007) analyze the impact of uncertainty and Bayesian learning in a two-party 
competition. They show how the interdependence between two policy-
motivated parties may lead to a more extreme or moderate positioning. Fur-
thermore, polarization is formally approached for two-party legislatures (Mer-
rill et al. 2014; Brunell et al. 2016).  
In sum, studies of party positioning show a wide range of innovations. 
These modifications may hold a mechanism to explain cabinet’s type influence 
on the polarization dynamic. For example, non-policy based considerations in 
the voter calculus might reflect the perception of the government record. Pursu-
ing different goals and parties’ different roles can lead to varying strategic 
choices and may result in a more extreme or moderate positioning. However, 
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these findings are related to the meso-level. Up to this point, we do not explain 
the output of the entire system – the sum of the party positioning. The excep-
tions are the few ABM studies on party competition, where the point of interest 
is shifted to the party system as a whole.  
In contrast to the party competition literature, comparative studies on party 
systems concentrate on macro-level dependencies. Yet again, one of the central 
innovations is still the work of Sartori (1976). To analyze party system dynam-
ics, Sartori (1976) introduces the idea of party system mechanics. He argues 
that fragmentation and ideological polarization characterize the nature of a 
party system. Polarization is defined as “an ideological distance, that is, the 
overall spread of the ideological spectrum of any given polity […]” (ibid., 
126). Therefore, “[we] have polarization when we have ideological distance [in 
contradistinction to ideological proximity]” (ibid., 135). Party systems charac-
terized as a type of “polarized pluralism” reveal a centrifugal party system 
mechanic. This dynamic can lead to a breakdown of the whole political system 
(Sartori 1976, 131-41). In contrast to polarized pluralism, “moderate pluralism” 
shows a centripetal dynamic as predicted in Downs’ example of a two-party 
system. The literature on polarization discusses the commonly adverse influ-
ences of a high ideological polarization. Correlations with cabinet survival, 
political stability, and other characteristics of political systems have been con-
firmed by empirical analyses (for a review, see Curini and Hino 2012, 460-1; 
Dalton 2008). What is currently missing in political science literature is a com-
bination of the party positioning literature, which concentrates on dynamics at 
the micro-level in multi-party systems, and the polarization literature, which 
focuses on macro-level dynamics. In the following, we combine both perspec-
tives in order to explain party system dynamics on both micro-and macro-level 
in multi-party systems. 
3. Two Potential Mechanisms: Limited Contestation and 
Incumbent Punishment 
In this section, we combine the different branches in the literature discussing 
party system dynamics in order to develop a model for explaining polarization. 
We argue that limited contestation between parties as well as incumbent pun-
ishment are the mechanisms that evoke polarizing dynamics.  
Regarding the actor level, we assume that parties act rationally in the sense 
that they maximize their utility. They try to take a position within the ideologi-
cal space that promises the highest utility for themselves. Parties have infor-
mation about the consequences of positioning ϕ ideological points to the left 
and right of their current position. Within this range, parties choose the current 
best position for themselves – the position that involves the highest utility. 
Referring to Strøm (1990), we model three different party goals: 
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vote-seeking (ϑ୮), office-seeking (ο୮), and policy-seeking (ρ୮). Therefore, 
party p’s utility (U୮) to position on a particular ideological position (Δ) is given 
by the following formula. The weight factors βଵ, βଶ, and βଷ describe a party’s 
different weighting of its goals. 
(Eq. 1) U୔୼ = βଵϑ୮୼ + βଶο୮୼ + βଷρ୮୼ ; where βଵ + βଶ + βଷ = 1  
The vote-seeking utility is simply determined by parties’ vote share (ϑ୮ = ୒౬౦୒౬ ) 
and the policy-seeking utility is the distance of the current taken position to 
preferred position divided by the maximal possible distance (ρ୮ = 1 − |୼౦ିஜ౦|ଵ଴଴ ). 
Thus, the highest policy-seeking utility (ρ = 1) is obviously achieved when the 
party takes its preferred position. The office-seeking utility of a party is deter-
mined by its necessity for potential cabinets. Thus, the office-seeking behavior 
is aimed at maximizing a party’s relevance in the post-election coalition for-
mation process.  
This party rationale is fully compatible with Sartori’s argument on what 
drives party system dynamics (Sartori 1976, 340-7). Two interlinked conditions 
are decisive in explaining theses dynamics of party competition: the pattern of 
opposition in combination with the occupation of the ideological center, both 
resulting from the type of cabinet. As long as the ideological center is not oc-
cupied, parties will try to attract voters at the ideological center, namely the 
median voter. Consequently, the competition dynamic is centripetal and di-
rected towards the center. Figure 1 illustrates such a situation within a five-
party system.  
Figure 1: The Centripetal Shift without an Occupied Center 
Source: Schmitt and Franzmann 2017a. 
 
Parties A and B form a coalition on the left side of the ideological spectrum. 
From now on, we will call this a “wing cabinet.” The opposition is formed by 
C, D, and E. All these parties belong to the opposite side of the ideological 
spectrum – the right side. We can see unilateral opposition from one direction 
since no relevant party exits to the left of the coalition government. If the oppo-
sition’s aim is to replace the present government after the election, the crucial 
votes will be located at the ideological center. As a result, competition between 
the two “teams” and a centripetal dynamic arise. 
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The opposite situation – a party system featuring polarized pluralism with 
centrifugal competition dynamics – is illustrated in Figure 2. The initiating 
competitive situation is characterized by the fact that the governing coalition is 
challenged by parties from both ends of the ideological spectrum. In this cir-
cumstance, the cabinet “occupies” the ideological center, which “implies that 
the central area of the political system is out of competition” (Sartori 1976, 
135). Thus, left- and right-wing voters constitute the contested voter popula-
tions during the electoral campaign. An ideological heating shapes this party 
competition, because no party’s strategy involves attracting voters at the ideo-
logical center. In consequence, the result is a continual undermining of the 
center parties’ electoral support. The opposition parties (A, D, and E) contest 
the coalition parties (B and C). The arrows symbolize the direction of the com-
petition. Based on this theory, we expect a centrifugal push from this govern-
ment-opposition pattern. 
Figure 2: The Centrifugal Push of Center Cabinets 
Source: Schmitt and Franzmann 2017a. 
 
However, Sartori presents no causal mechanism, just a description of the gen-
eral pattern of the direction of competition. His type of polarized pluralism 
orients on historical examples such as the Weimar Republic and the Italian 
party system. How can we trace this pattern back to a mechanism based on a 
behavioral theory of both parties and voters? We have to think about which 
types of interaction could potentially create such a mechanism. The basic types 
of party competition are contest and cooperation. Cooperation occurs when two 
parties have similar goals and show solidarity, while contest results from a 
zero-sum game where a gain by one party leads to a loss by the other 
(Franzmann 2011, 320-2). In Figure 2, the coalition parties (B and C) do not 
contest each other in the fight for the median voter. They cooperate in order to 
be re-elected as a coalition. We call this mechanism limited contestation since a 
decisive battle for center votes is absent. Theoretically, it is possible that the 
center cabinet partners will not cooperate during the next electoral campaign. 
In that case, such a centrifugal push will not necessarily be present. 
If this mechanism is present and center cabinet parties avoid fighting for the 
median voter, it also has a tremendous impact on the opposition parties’ behav-
ior. They are restricted in their goals. These parties cannot expect to form a 
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post-electoral coalition with recent cabinet parties. Hence, their opportunities to 
achieve their office-seeking goals are limited.  
This line of reasoning can be illustrated by the opposite situation. Within a 
party system with a wing cabinet, as portrayed in Figure 1, the opposition is 
still able to form an alternative “team” that can potentially win elections and 
form a post-electoral coalition. Hence, the opposition still pursues its office-
seeking aims. Furthermore, the decisive votes to win the election are placed at 
the ideological center for both teams. For example, when a (left-wing) coalition 
(e.g., Figure 1, parties A and B) and the ideologically homogeneous (right-
wing) opposition (e.g., parties C, D, and E in Figure 1) cooperate within their 
own groups and both try to win the election, they have to attract contested 
voters around the ideological median position.  
In Figure 2, featuring polarized pluralism, the opposition is split up into two 
ideologically separate groups in a party system with a center cabinet. Because 
of their ideological differences, they do not represent a serious alternative to 
the governing cabinet (Sartori 1976, 134). Each group of opposition parties 
may not be capable of winning the majority in the election. In this situation, 
opposition parties are not able to pursue any of their office-seeking goals. This 
is particularly interesting because office-seeking objectives commonly result in 
more moderate positioning. The reason for this is that ideological differences to 
other parties lower party’s coalition potential. As a consequence of the preven-
tion of office-seeking opportunities, opposition parties concentrate solely on 
policy- and vote-seeking goals when a center cabinet is present. This eventually 
leads to increasing polarization instead of competition for the median voter. 
While this is a mechanism based only on party behavior, a second hypothet-
ical mechanism relies on the voter-party relationship. Party democracies rely 
on responsiveness and accountability: Parties should be responsive to voters’ 
demands, and parties have to be held accountable for their courses of action. In 
order to guarantee accountability, voters can use their vote in the next election 
and sanction or reward parties (Bühlmann and Kriesi 2013). Consequently, 
voters can punish the government by voting for the opposition. In consequence, 
the opposition may become the future government and be held accountable in 
the following election. However, as discussed, in polarized pluralism opposi-
tion parties have no chance to participate in government. Consequently, ac-
countability is of no concern for them. 
Contrary to that, everything else being equal, within a party system with a 
wing cabinet, a dissatisfied voter has a moderate alternative. Referring to the 
outlined examples (see Figures 1 and 2), a dissatisfied voter of party B in Fig-
ure 1 can switch to the moderate alternative party (C). In contrast, a dissatisfied 
voter in Figure 2 may shift to the non-moderate parties (A or D). Hence, penal-
ization of the cabinet by voters in combination with the government-opposition 
patterns cause a centrifugal dynamic due to the changing voting behavior. This 
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dynamic persists since the opposition has no real chance to get into power. In 
the following, we call this mechanism incumbent punishment.  
We integrate this idea in the proximity voting calculus of spatial theory. The 
received utility of voting for a party results from the distance to the party, or, in 
other words, the utility U of voter v to vote for party p amounts to the negative, 
ideological distance to this party:  
(Eq. 2)  U୴୮ = −|Δ୮ − Δ୴| 
Hence, the voter receives the highest utility by voting for the party with the 
lowest distance from their own ideological position. This voting model is often 
criticized because of its simplicity. In fact, empirical models based on the 
Michigan model (Campbell et al. 1954) include more variables to explain vot-
ing behavior, e.g. party identification and candidate evaluation. In recent stud-
ies of agent-based party competition models, these non-policy factors were also 
included in the voting heuristics (e.g. Laver and Sergenti 2012; Plümper and 
Martin 2008). These analyses show that such factors can have a striking effect 
on the competition dynamic. For example, Plümper and Martin (2008) show 
that party identification of specific voters can trigger a centrifugal push without 
any voter polarization present. To consider these insights, non-policy voting 
considerations were added to the voting heuristic. Therefore, we could control 
whether the effect of the cabinet type presupposed any assumption about non-
policy voting motivations within the electorate. This factor was simply includ-
ed in the primary voting model (Eq. 2): 
(Eq. 3)  U୴୮ = −หΔ୮ − Δ୴ห + ε୴୮ 
A positive evaluation increases the utility for voting for this party, and vice 
versa. In an extreme case, it can be so strong that the voting decision is deter-
mined independently from the parties’ positions. However, we do not make any 
assumptions about the origins of these non-policy evaluations by voters. In the 
model, we considered only two assumptions: (1) there are different types of 
possible distributions (outlined below) and (2) this factor is time-invariant 
during the election campaign – with one exception. Incumbent punishment is 
realized as a time-dependent malus based on voters’ negative evaluation of 
cabinet parties.  
With these two mechanisms, we have added a behavioral perspective to Sar-
tori’s (1976) classical approach. In his milestone work, Sartori does not link his 
argumentation with specified assumptions about party positioning or voting 
behavior. The so-called “black box” is now filled with behavioral mechanisms 
(Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 51-3). We used Coleman’s (1994) macro-micro-
macro model to outline the problem within the explanation (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: The Black Box of the Theoretical Framework 
 
When we assume that the cabinet type causes a different competition dynamic, 
the specific distribution of the cabinet membership within inter-party competi-
tion has to have an influence on the positioning or voting behavior of any actor. 
The two outlined mechanisms are the conceptual base of our ABM. Both offer 
potential explanations for the influence of center cabinets on the competition 
dynamic. Strictly speaking, this step does not represent a theoretical deduction 
because of the missing precision of the axioms and assumptions. We formed a 
conceptual basis for the ABM. The systematic micro-foundation and integra-
tion of precise, formal assumptions are covered in the following section. 
4. The Agent Based Model  
In this section, we outline the ABM. First, we explain why we rely on this 
method. Then we explain the parties’ as well as voters’ calculus. Relying on 
different types, we implement the two mechanisms outlined above. The out-
come is party system polarization.  
ABMs are certainly not in common use in social science (de Marchi and 
Page 2014; Squazzoni 2010), and there are crucial differences between them 
and other analytical (game-theory) models (de Marchi and Page 2008; Laver 
and Sergenti 2012, vi-xii) and other computational approaches (Gilbert and 
Troitzsch 2005). Two central characteristics of the modeling approach are most 
important for comparisons with alternative methods of model building: the 
agent-oriented perspective and the computational approach (e.g. Gilbert 2008; 
Railsback and Grimm 2012, 9-12). 
Regarding an object-oriented logic, actors are autonomous objects of a de-
fined class with independent states embedded in a context. Based on the pro-
gramming language, there are vast opportunities to realize theoretical assump-
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tions in the formal model, such as heterogeneous actors, proactive or reactive 
behaviors, and social capabilities. However, a core element of an ABM is its 
iterative function, which represents a dynamic process in contrast to analytical 
models. Therefore, actors’ behaviors are rule based, and these actors must 
make decisions in defined sequences of action (Schmitt 2015). 
Based on its advantages, the ABM approach is suitable for a (theoretical) 
analysis of macro-level outcomes of micro- and meso-level mechanisms in 
complex environments (Axelrod and Tesfatsion 2006, 1649-50). The applica-
tion of this approach requires the implementation of several explicit and, so far, 
implicit theoretical concepts within the programming environment. We have to 
realize three major aspects for our ABM: 
1) The general structure of the party system: What kind of ideological dimen-
sion exists? How many parties and voters are there? How are their ideologi-
cal positions and preferences distributed? 
2) The actors, their characteristics and their heuristics: How do parties position 
themselves on the competitive dimension and how do voters decide to vote 
for a party? 
3) The general sequence of action: When do actors act? What is the order be-
tween the different actions, e.g. party positioning and voting decision? How 
often does the loop of actions iterate? 
In the following, we describe each point to explain the structure of our ABM. 
First, we describe the general model, its loop, and its properties. Lastly, all 
model parameters, their variations, and the measured outcome are summarized. 
We realized the model in NetLogo. The implementation can be downloaded at 
our project home page2 and all results can be reproduced based on the available 
software.  
4.1  Overview 
Following previous ABMs (e.g., Laver and Sergenti 2012) and spatial models 
of party competition, the basic structure of our model is relatively simple and 
represents an electoral competition before an election. Parties’ positions in the 
left-right dimension are based on a utility function in sequences. Subsequently, 
voters rethink their voting choice. After a determined number of campaign 
turns, a simulation run ends and the patterns of competition produced by the 
interaction between voters and parties are measured. At the beginning, the 
existing cabinet type and other starting conditions are exogenously determined.  
                                                             
2  <www.pruf.de/dfg-projekt-opposition> (Accessed January 16, 2018). 
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Figure 4: A Basic Loop of the Simulation Model 
 
The first step of the model (starting conditions) implies the determination of the 
party system structure and is carried out before the first iteration of a simula-
tion run. The next two steps represent the general loop of the ABM: Parties 
(re-) position on the left-right dimension (step 2) and voters choose their pre-
ferred parties considering the present circumstances (step 3). This sequence 
iterates many times. After the last iteration, the output – the change of polariza-
tion – is measured (step 4) and the simulation run ends. The analysis leans on 
many different simulation runs with varying starting conditions. 
4.2  Context: The General Structure of the Party Competition 
The modeled context of the party system represents the logical starting point of 
our ABM. The basic structure is defined by the main axis of ideological com-
petition, the voter distribution, and the number of relevant parties. Of course, 
the electoral system is one of the most striking institutional features structuring 
party competition. Since we analyze multi-party competition, we assume a 
simple proportional representation system with a direct translation of votes into 
seats.  
The ideological space is modeled as unidimensional and ranges from 0 to 
100. In the tradition of Downs (1957) as well as political sociology (Inglehart 
1984), we label this unidimensional space as a left-right axis. Literature on 
ABM (e.g. Laver and Sergenti 2012) and empirical studies of party competition 
(e.g. Kitschelt 1994) discuss the existence of an at least two-dimensional space. 
Nevertheless, empirical studies (e.g. Marks et al. 2006) demonstrate that the 
transformation of the European political space from a ‘pure’ economic one into 
a space that also covers a libertarian-authoritarian axis results again in a unidi-
mensional solution. The difference is that economic and social issues merged 
into a new left-right dimension representing a country-specific combination of 
both axes (Inglehart 1984; Marks et al. 2006). A second dimension that cuts 
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through the main axis of party competition logically leads to a decrease of 
polarization. Consequently, we stick to the one-dimensional solution, because 
the specific kind of combination of economic and social issues is not relevant 
for our study. 
Technically, we implement in NetLogo the ideological dimension with 101 
so-called “patches.” Each patch is a defined number of voters (v) that possess 
this ideological position (Δ୴). Also, each party (݌) has one unique position (Δ୮). 
In contrast to a party’s position, we model voter’s ideological position as time-
invariant during the same electoral cycle. Of course, in real-world electoral 
campaigns, we will observe endogenous preference formation processes. Never-
theless, empirically ideological positions are relatively stable (Van der Eijk et 
al. 2005). In a pre-test of our ABM, we included an endogenous preference 
formation within the electorate (Schmitt 2014). It reveals that different assump-
tions about such a preference formation process do not affect our analyzed 
dependency. Thus, we forgo to model the flexibility of voter preferences to 
reduce model’s complexity.  
Regarding the voter distribution at the aggregate level, two ideal types are of 
particular interest for us: unimodal and bimodal distributions. Although other 
distributions are discussed in the literature (e.g. Caramani 2008, 341-2), this 
study focuses on the two ideal types. Regarding polarization, voter distributions 
should evoke different dynamics. All else being equal, a bimodal distribution 
creates incentives to compete for relatively more extreme voters, whereas a 
unimodal distribution supports competition for the median voter. Furthermore, 
the standard deviation of both distribution types can vary. Thus, different nu-
ances can be mapped within the models. The advantage of this procedure is that 
the voter distribution can be captured by just two parameters in the model. Like 
the voter distribution, the number of voters is also determined before the very 
first iteration of the simulation run. The concrete number of voters is not rele-
vant for the simulation dynamics. Only if there are very few voters, the number 
influences model’s dynamics because the distribution is not represented cor-
rectly. For example, fifty voters can only present partly a normal distribution 
on a 101-point scale. However, Schmitt (2014) has demonstrated that if the 
number exceeds a thousand voters, there will be no effect. Hence, we fixed the 
number of voters at one million.3  
The number of parties varies between 3 and 10. This number is also exoge-
nously determined and invariant during a simulation run. Logically, we need at 
least three parties to generate the possibility of a central government with a 
bilateral opposition. In the following subsections, we discuss how the mecha-
                                                             
3  Regarding the concrete technical realization, one million objects in NetLogo would require 
high computational resources. To avoid this problem, each patch represents a set of voters 
to minimize the computing time. This is possible because voters on the same ideological po-
sition do not differ from each other. 
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nisms of limited contestation and incumbent punishment are implemented 
given the context of party competition. 
4.3  Implementing the Mechanism of Limited Contestation  
As discussed above, we assume that parties act rationally in the sense that they 
maximize their utility regarding vote-, office-, and policy-seeking goals. In our 
model, each party’s starting position on the left-right scale is randomly as-
signed. From this starting position, parties try to find a place within the ideo-
logical space that promises the highest utility for themselves. They have infor-
mation about the consequences of positioning ϕ ideological points to the left 
and right of their current position in each iteration. Within this range, parties 
choose the current best position for themselves – the position that involves the 
highest utility. In each iteration, each party can reposition one time. At that 
time, the party has the information about the present positions of the other 
parties and the voter preferences. The order of action between the parties is 
selected randomly in each iteration. Furthermore, the information capacity ϕ 
varies between simulation runs and is equal for all parties within the same run 
(see Table 1). 
The cabinet affiliation determines whether a party is part of the present cab-
inet or not. This factor is exogenously determined at the beginning of a simula-
tion and is also time-invariant. The following three attributes are necessary for 
a party’s pursuit of its three different aims: (1) The party’s current hypothetical 
vote share, which unsurprisingly represents recent voter support as a proportion 
that can change after each repositioning and varies between zero and one; (2) 
coalition potential, which represents the number of potential post-election 
cabinets in which a party’s membership is necessary; and (3) ideological pref-
erence, which represents the party’s actual preferred position in the ideological 
dimension. To sum up, purely vote-seeking parties act based on their vote 
share, office-seeking parties only orientate themselves according to their coalition 
potential, and policy-seeking parties take their preferred ideological position. 
The office-seeking utility of a party is determined by its necessity for poten-
tial cabinets. This theoretical argument is realized as follows in the model: In 
each iteration, each party forms a hypothetically connected, minimal winning 
coalition (Axelrod 1970), of which it is a part. This coalition represents the 
current favored cabinet of the party. If a party is potentially able to form a 
cabinet without any other party’s support, it forms a hypothetical one-party 
cabinet instead of a coalition. A party reaches the highest utility when it is 
required for all n post-election cabinets. Hence, we calculated office-seeking 
utility as the proportion of a party’s involvement in these cabinets (ο୮ = 	୒ಐ౦୒ಐ ). 
  
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  183 
In order to implement the mechanism of limited contestation, we modified 
cabinet parties’ office-seeking utility. The basic idea of limited contestation is 
that the affiliation with the cabinet shapes parties’ behavior. Cabinet parties 
cooperate within their coalition and contest opposition parties. This assumption 
is realized in two ways: (1) Parties in a coalition do not try to win votes at the 
expense of another coalition party. Thus, they try to win the election as a team. 
(2) In addition, coalition parties do not pursue the formation of an alternative 
coalition with opposition parties after the election. 
Instead of maximizing their necessity in different potential cabinets, these 
parties try to maximize the current cabinet’s chance of reelection. We measured 
this chance by the sum of a cabinet’s vote share. When limited contestation is 
present in the model, the utility of a cabinet party is the sum of the cabinet’s 
vote share multiplied by the party’s office-seeking utility. Furthermore, cabinet 
parties are not part of the potential coalition bargaining of opposition parties. 
In the course of developing the ABM, a further question arose: How do non-
contesting cabinet parties choose between positions with the same utility? This 
frequently happens in runs with limited contestation.  
Two different solutions were implemented: (1) Parties decide on the basis of 
their own vote- and/or policy-seeking utility depending on the weighting of 
these goals. Thus, a partial contestation between cabinet parties is possible 
when the electoral strength of the cabinet does not drop. We call this first type 
partial contestation. (2) As an alternative, cabinet parties additionally try to 
reduce the ideological discrepancies within the cabinet. Thus, if the utility of 
the two positions is equal, the party chooses the one with lower intra-cabinet 
variance in ideological positions. We call this second type avoiding cabinet 
contestation.  
To summarize, in our ABM parties decide autonomously based on (1) their 
ideological positions taken Δ୴, (2) their cabinet affiliationsτ୮ (); (3) their cur-
rent hypothetical vote shares (ϑ୮); (4) their coalition potentials (ο୮); and (5) 
their ideological preferences (μ୮).  
4.4  Implementing the Mechanism of Incumbent Punishment 
At the end of each iteration, voters choose their current preferred party. The 
voter calculus is discussed above. Consequently, we assume that voters know 
the present positions of all parties. In order to implement the mechanism of 
incumbent punishment, we add two modifications to the classical voter calcu-
lus: (1) non-policy evaluation of the parties and (2) the favored party. First, 
non-policy evaluation is a vector with a length equal to the number of parties 
(ε୴ሬሬሬԦ). Each value represents the evaluation of one party by the voter (ε୴୮). A 
positive value represents a positive non-policy evaluation, and vice versa. Sec-
ond, the voter’s favored party (α୴) represents the party that they would elect if 
the election was held now. The favored party is chosen by the voter after each 
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repositioning of a party. Thus, the favored party can change more than once per 
iteration. 
When testing the potential effects of this non-policy factor, the following 
distributions occurred in the model. The different distributions vary randomly 
between runs and are exogenously determined. In addition, the strength of the 
non-policy factor is determined by a further model parameter (Ε, see Table 1). 
(1) Non-policy factor distribution type I (none): All parties are evaluated 
by all voters with a value of zero (ε୴୮ = 0). 
(2) Non-policy factor distribution type II (random): In this scenario the 
evaluation rests upon a random draw. This draw is based on a normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of the de-
fined non-policy weight (Ε). Because of the high number of voters, all 
parties have more or less the same evaluation bonus within the elec-
torate. Furthermore, this bonus is uncorrelated with the positions of 
parties and voters.  
(3) Non-policy factor distribution type III (distance-based): In contrast to 
type II, the voters’ evaluation is not based on a random draw. It rests 
upon the starting distance of voters to the party. Referring to the non-
policy weight (Ε), a voter v evaluates party p based on their positions Δ 
as follows:  
(Eq. 4)  ε୴୮ = ହ଴ିห୼౬ି୼౦หହ଴ ∗ Ε.  
As a consequence, a party with the same ideological position as the voter re-
ceives the highest evaluation (+1 ∗ Ε) and a party with the highest possible 
distance receives the lowest possible evaluation (−1 ∗ ݓ). In this scenario, 
parties start in “their” voter population and both factors – ideological position 
and party evaluation – are highly correlated. 
(4) Non-policy factor distribution type IV (distance-based, biased): This 
distribution type is identical to the former, distanced-based scenario 
with one exception. Each party has a random chance of 0.5 to gain a 
higher evaluation bonus from all voters (ε୴୮ = ε୴୮ ∗ 1.5). Voter evalua-
tion has a high inter-party variance. In consequence, there are parties 
with a positive and negative handicap. 
The mechanism of incumbent punishment is implemented by changing voters’ 
non-policy evaluation of cabinet parties. In every iteration, voters’ non-policy 
factors of those parties decrease by the defined degree. This decreasing factor 
can vary between 1 and 25 divided by the number of iterations. Therefore, the 
chance of voting for a cabinet lowers step by step. In addition to the non-policy 
factor, voters’ ideological positions are defined based on two input parameters: 
distribution type and standard deviation (see Table 1).  
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Figure 5: The Basic Model Structure 
 
Figure 5 summarizes the basic model structure defined by the context, parties 
calculus and voters’ calculus. It outlines a five-party system with a unimodal 
voter distribution and a wing cabinet (parties A and B). 
4.5  Measured Outcome: Polarization 
In the literature, different approaches to measuring party system polarization 
are frequently discussed (e.g., Sigelman and Yough 1978; Dalton 2008; for a 
review see Schmitt and Franzmann 2017b). The most common variants are the 
standard deviation, the range, or the mean absolute difference in parties’ ideo-
logical positions. In addition to the different measurements of dispersions, 
authors also utilize different weighting concepts, e.g., weighting by parties’ 
vote or seat share. In contrast to the empirical data, the differences between 
these measurements were relatively small within the simulation. For example, 
the correlation between the vote-share-weighted standard deviation and the 
range was 0.92. Hence, the choice of one of these indicators was not decisive. 
We chose the most common variant – vote-share-weighted standard deviation – 
to measure polarization (P): 
(Eq. 5)  P = 	ට∑ (ϑ୮ ∗ (Δ୮ − Δഥ)²)୒୮ୀଵ  
Polarization was measured before the first and after the last iteration. The com-
petition (also called polarization) dynamic resulted from subtracting the first 
iteration polarization from the last iteration polarization (Dynamic = Plast −
Pfirst). Therefore, a positive value of polarization means an increasing 
polarization, and vice versa.  
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4.6  Model’s Parameterization and the Analyzing Strategy 
In sum, 15 variables (or input parameters) were included in the model (see 
Table 1).  
Table 1: Input Parameters 
 Model parameter Variation of random draw
Pa
rt
ie
s 
Iterations ݔ ∈ ℕ: 40 ≤ ݔ ≤ 80 
Random seed ݔ ∈ ℕ:−2147483648 ≤ ݔ ≤ 2147483647 
Information capacity ݔ ∈ ℕ: 1 ≤ ݔ ≤ 5 
Number of parties ݔ ∈ ℕ: 3 ≤ ݔ ≤ 10
Cabinet type Wing or center 
Vote-seeking weight constant, 
ଵ
௦௨௠ ௢௙ ௔௟௟ ௪௘௜௚௛௧௦ 
Office-seeking weight ݔ = ݋ ݋ݎ 1, ௫௦௨௠ ௢௙ ௔௟௟ ௪௘௜௚௛௧௦ 
Policy-seeking weight ݔ = ݋ ݋ݎ 1, ௫௦௨௠ ௢௙ ௔௟௟ ௪௘௜௚௛௧௦ 
Limited contestation (either type I or II)
Type I: partial contestation 
Type II: avoiding cabinet contestation 
Absence or presence 
Vo
te
rs
 
Voter distribution uni- or bimodal 
Standard deviation of voter distribu-
tion ݔ ∈ ℕ: 20 ≤ ݔ ≤ 50 
Distribution of non-policy factor* 
Four different types: 
Type I: None 
Type II: Random 
Type III: Distance-based 
Type IV: Biased 
Non-policy weight ݔ ∈ ℕ: 1 ≤ ݔ ≤ 25 
Incumbent punishment Absence or present 
Punishment weight ݔ ∈ ℕ: 1 ≤ ݔ ≤ 25 
 
To compute all potential combinations, a huge number of repetitions would be 
required – particularly regarding all potential random seeds (approx. 85.410 
runs). Because of limited computational resources, a full parameterization 
(such as grid sweeping) (Laver and Sergenti 2012, 57-8) was not achievable. 
The alternative strategy was random parameterization (Izquierdo et al. 2009), 
in which overall validity can be estimated by test statistics, such as tests of 
statistical significance (p-values) and standard errors. Therefore, the value of 
each variable (or parameter) was randomly chosen at the beginning of a simula-
tion run. After computing the iterations, the output of interest was measured. 
This process was repeated many times. Thus, the simulation model produced a 
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dataset where one case was one simulation run, and the (observed) dynamics of 
the ABM were thereby analyzed. A simulation based on random parameteriza-
tion can be interpreted as a sample of all possible input variants of the model 
(the population). 
In addition, all explanatory variables can be present or absent when testing 
counterfactual dependencies in the logic of an experimental design (Marchion-
ni and Ylikoski 2013). Thus, this study uses inferential statistics and regression 
analysis to analyze the output data of the agent-based simulation. Hence, the 
mechanisms are tested on the theoretical, not empirical, level in the following 
analysis. 
5. Simulation Results 
The overall aim of our analysis of the simulation output was the identification 
of logical configurations causing a constellation of polarized pluralism. To this 
end, we first utilized a linear regression to explore the general patterns the 
ABM reveals. Then we started identifying the relevant conditions for the center 
cabinet’s effect by applying correlation analysis of cabinet type with outcome 
polarization under different parameter configurations. Using Boolean algebra, 
we demonstrated the circumstances under which center cabinets are decisive to 
explain centrifugal drives.  
Table 2: Explaining the Final Level of Polarization  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3a Model 3b 
Intercept 0.602** 0.581** 0.635** 0.573**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Polarization (t=0; start) 0.612** 0.612** 0.611** 0.612**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cabinet type (0: Wing; 1: 
Center) 
0.108**
(0.001) 
0.108**
(0.001) 
0.001
(0.001) 
0.125**
(0.001) 
Limited Contestation (1: yes) 0.017** -0.082** 0.017**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Incumbent punishment  
(1: yes)  
0.022**
(0.001) 
0.023** 0.039**
(0.001) (0.001)
Cabinet type* 
Limited contestation 
0.197**
(0.002)
Cabinet type* Incumbents’ 
punishment 
-0.033**
(0.002)
adj. R-squared 0.219 0.220 0.224 0.220
N 2,500,000 2,500,000 2,500,000 2,500,000 
Significance level: * 0.01 and ** 0.001; standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
Starting with an overview, we analyzed the statistical relationship between the 
competition dynamic and cabinet type with the help of linear regression analy-
sis. Furthermore, limited contestation and incumbent punishment were included 
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in the model to separately test two-level interaction effects. The dependent 
variable was the final polarization level within a simulation run and, in addi-
tion, the starting polarization was an independent variable. In this first step, we 
applied limited contestation without separating the two types. This distinction 
was made in the subsequent analysis steps. 
The regression models revealed a rather weak effect of the cabinet type. 
However, this effect was significant and positive. Center cabinets are more 
likely to result in increasing polarization than wing cabinets. Thus, the searched 
dependency was, at least, present in the ABM. Nevertheless, the partial ex-
plained variance based on cabinet type was just 0.007 in model 1. The signifi-
cance level was based solely on the high number of cases instead of the effect 
strength. Regarding all simulation runs, this effect is indeed insufficient to 
statistically explain the polarization level. 
In model 2, limited contestation and incumbent punishment were included. 
Both variables showed the expected positive effect and squared R increased 
slightly. Furthermore, two interaction effects were added step by step. First, the 
interaction between cabinet type and limited contestation revealed a positive, 
significant coefficient. Concurrently, the effect of cabinet type became insignif-
icant and the explained variance increased somewhat. Hence, the effect of the 
cabinet type depends on the presence of the mechanism of limited contestation. 
On the contrary, the second interaction effect was weaker and negative.  
When limited contestation and incumbent punishment were both absent, the 
distributions were virtually identical in simulation runs with wing and center 
cabinets (see Appendix Figure 13). Hence, there was no dependency between 
government-opposition patterns and the polarization dynamic. Only when 
limited contestation was present could we observe a systematic difference in 
the polarization dynamic between runs with wing and center cabinets. This 
corroborated our main assumption derived from Sartori’s party system theory. 
However, all effects were rather weak and the sole presence of limited contes-
tation does not explain the substantial impact of the cabinet type on the polari-
zation dynamic. Furthermore, the weak interaction effect between cabinet type 
and limited contestation depended on the centripetal dynamic by wing cabinets. 
To examine potential conditions for dependency, we next analyzed the in-
fluence of cabinet type in varying parameter configurations. Therefore, we 
calculated the correlation within different subsamples. Each subsample con-
tained a specific parameter constellation.4 In sum, there were 1152 subsamples. 
Here, the dependent variable of interest was the correlation between cabinet 
                                                             
4  Simulation runs were assigned to different subsamples based on the following parameters: 
categorized party number (low: 3-4, medium: 5-7, high: 8-10), limited contestation, incum-
bent punishment, voter preference distribution, non-policy factor distribution, the occur-
rence of policy- and office-seeking goals, as well as the categorized information capacity 
(low: ≤ median, high: > median). 
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type and polarization dynamic. The presence or absence of the input parameters 
were the dependent variables. The following calculations refer to this dataset 
(for an illustration of this dataset structure see Appendix Table 6). The distribu-
tion of the correlation coefficients revealed a noticeable variance. 
Figure 6: Density Plots of Correlation Coefficients 
 
In the upper plot, we observed that there was no (or a rather weak) correlation 
in most subsamples. Furthermore, no strong negative correlations were present. 
In contrast, we found some configurations with a strong positive relationship. 
In sum, 78 configurations showed a correlation coefficient above 0.5. In the 
bottom plots, the distribution is distinguished by the presence of limited contes-
tation (left) and incumbent punishment (right). Unsurprisingly, if incumbent 
punishment and limited contestation were absent, configurations with signifi-
cant correlations did not appear. In all configurations with correlations above 
0.52, limited contestation was present. In contrast to incumbent punishment, 
this mechanism is clearly necessary for the dependency between cabinet type 
and the polarization dynamic. On the contrary, the incumbent punishment was 
also absent from all configurations with a very high correlation (r ≥ 0.66). 
Next, we examined the effect of different model parameters on the correlation 
via linear regression analysis. 
The regression disclosed that the mechanism of limited contestation influ-
ences the degree of correlation. Furthermore, office-seeking goals positively 
affected the examined relationship. This impact is not surprising, because the 
appearance of limited contestation presupposes an office-seeking objective. In 
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addition, party number and policy-seeking weight also exhibited positive and 
significant coefficients. Hence, all non-vote-seeking heuristics increased the 
statistical effect of a center cabinet on the competition dynamic. 
Table 3:  Explaining the Occurrence of a High Dependency of Cabinet Type 
with the Polarization Dynamic 
DV: R cabinet type * polarization dynamic Model 1 
 Coeff. B S.E. 
Intercept -0.143** 0.016 
Office-seeking weight > 0 (1: yes) 0.150** 0.009 
Policy-seeking weight > 0 (1: yes) 0.107** 0.009 
Voter distribution (1: bimodal) -0.010 0.009 
incumbent punishment (1: yes) 0.009 0.009 
Reference: Low party number   
Medium party number 0.031* 0.011 
High party number 0.059** 0.011 
Reference: No limited contestation   
Limited contestation type I 0.091** 0.011 
Limited contestation type II 0.204** 0.011 
Reference: Non-policy distribution type I 
Non-policy distribution type II 0.025 0.013 
Non-policy distribution type III -0.019 0.013 
Non-policy distribution type IV -0.022 0.013 
adj. R-squared  0.396 
N  1152 
Significance level: * 1% and ** 0.1%. 
 
To go into more detail, we examined the parameter configuration, which exhib-
ited a very high correlation. The defined threshold was an explained variance 
of at least 50 percent. In total, 15 constellations met this criterion. 
Each row represents one set of a parameter configuration that leads to a high 
explained variance by the cabinet type. For example, regarding the first row of 
the table, there is an effect of the cabinet type, when the number of parties is 
between five and seven, limited contestation is present, parties aim for office-, 
policy-, and vote-seeking goals, the voter distribution is unimodal and so on. 
To summarize this rather large table, we minimize these results based on Bool-
ean algebra. Therefore, Figure 7 outlines the result.5 Each shape represents a 
model parameter of the table and each link symbolizes a logical “and”-
                                                             
5  In more detail, the result is following equation: OPeC୍୍ ∗ (iN୫ୣୢ(D୍ + D୍୍୍) + N୦୧୥୦(D୍(i +
v) + D୍୍୍ + D୍୚)) → R²ஹ.ହ. The equation refers to Boolean algebra terminology. The logical or 
is represented by a “+” and the logical and by a “*.” Furthermore, uppercase symbolizes the 
presence of the parameter, whereas lowercase symbolizes its absence. 
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dependency between two parameters. One continuous way without any turning 
represents one set of parameter configurations, which sufficiently leads to an 
effect of the cabinet type within the simulation model. A fork separates two 
different sets and is marked by a logical “or.” Hence, we have five different 
sets which are sufficient for the presence of an effect of the cabinet type on the 
polarization dynamic: 
Table 4:  Parameter Configurations with a High Correlation of Cabinet Type 
with Polarization 
Number 
of parties 
(class) 
Limited 
contes-
tation 
Office-
seeking 
Policy-
seeking 
Voter 
distribu-
tion 
Incum-
bent 
punish-
ish-
ment 
Non-
policy 
distri-
bution 
Infor-
mation 
(class) 
N C O P V E D I 
Medium Type II Present Present Unimodal No Type I Low 
High Type II Present Present Unimodal No Type I Low 
High Type II Present Present Bi-modal No Type I Low 
High Type II Present Present Unimodal No Type III Low 
Medium Type II Present Present Bi-modal No Type I Low 
High Type II Present Present Bi-modal No Type IV Low 
High Type II Present Present Bi-modal No Type IV High 
High Type II Present Present Bi-modal No Type III High 
Medium Type II Present Present Unimodal No Type III Low 
High Type II Present Present Unimodal No Type III High 
High Type II Present Present Unimodal No Type IV Low 
High Type II Present Present Bi-modal No Type III Low 
High Type II Present Present Unimodal No Type I High 
Medium Type II Present Present Bi-modal No Type III Low 
High Type II Present Present Unimodal No Type IV High 
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First of all, office- (O) and policy-seeking (P) weights are necessary for the 
presence of a strong correlation. Thus, purely vote-seeking parties hinder the 
occurrence of a strong impact. Furthermore, the absence of incumbent punish-
ment (e) is also inevitable. The punishment slightly reduces the difference 
between the average dynamics of runs with wing and center cabinets. Further-
more, limited contestation (C୍୍) is obviously also necessary. Here, only limited 
contestation that is avoiding any cabinet contestation is part of the explaining 
configuration. The OLS-regression showed that this type increases the depend-
ency more than partial contestation (see Table 3).  
Furthermore, a medium or high number of parties (N୫ୣୢ and N୦୧୥୦) is re-
quired. Sartori (1976, 131) already discussed this necessity. In party systems 
with fewer than five parties, a strong impact by the cabinet type on the compe-
tition dynamic does not appear. Thus, the model supports the outlined pre-
sumption. Lastly, only one type of non-policy factor distribution was not part 
of the configuration: the random draw (D୍୍). Thus, a missing non-policy factor 
or a somehow correlated non-policy factor is presupposed for cabinet type’s 
effect. In some constellations, low information capacity is also needed. A low 
information capacity hinders a party’s finding of global utility maxima. Parties’ 
sticking in local maxima can explain centrifugal shifts under a non-polarized 
electorate. 
To summarize, the regression model and the configurational analysis 
showed that there are several conditions and influence factors related to the 
occurrence of the dependency of cabinet type on ideological dynamics. In 
particular, an office-seeking motivation, limited contestation, and a high num-
ber of parties explain the appearance of this relationship. However, up to this 
point, we have only explained the effect of cabinet type on the polarization 
dynamic, but have not yet answered the original question: When do center 
cabinets have a centrifugal effect? The distribution of polarizing dynamics 
within the outlined parameter constellation of Figure 7 (see Appendix Figure 
14) reveals that the median dynamic within runs of center cabinets is close to 
zero. Hence, almost half of the runs lead to a decreasing polarization even 
though a center cabinet is present. The strong correlation does not rest upon the 
centrifugal effect of center cabinets; on the contrary, the centripetal impact of 
wing cabinets causes the strong statistical relationship. 
As the last step, we analyzed the conditions for the polarizing impact of cen-
ter cabinets. For this purpose, beyond the correlation, we added a second crite-
rion to select parameter configurations: the consistency of center cabinets as a 
sufficient condition for the occurrence of an increase in polarization. This 
measure was originally developed as part of the QCA (Ragin 2006). Here, this 
indicator reveals the number of simulation runs with center cabinets and an 
increasing polarization divided by the total number of center cabinet runs. 
Thus, we looked for parameter configurations that showed a strong correlation 
between cabinet type and the polarization dynamic, as well as the high con-
sistency of center cabinets, as a sufficient condition for the presence of a cen-
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trifugal push. Because none of the original configurations met these criteria, we 
added two more variables: starting polarization and the standard deviation (SD) 
of voter distribution.6 
Based on the selected 10 parameters, the correlation and consistency were 
calculated in 4608 different parameter constellations. Here, we defined the 
following thresholds: a consistency of at least 0.95 and a correlation of at least 
0.6. In such a configuration, most center cabinet runs led to a centrifugal push 
and there was a relatively high discrepancy between wing and center cabinet 
repetitions. In sum, six configurations met these criteria. 
Table 5: Explaining the Centrifugal Push by Center Cabinets 
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S N C O P V T E D I 
Low Medium Type II Yes No Bimodal Low Yes Type I High 
Low Medium Type I Yes No Bimodal Low Yes Type I High 
Low Medium Type I Yes No Bimodal High Yes Type I High 
Low High Type II Yes No Bimodal High Yes Type III High 
Low High Type II Yes No Bimodal Low Yes Type III High 
Low Medium Type II Yes No Bimodal High Yes Type I High 
 
Furthermore, we proceed in the same way as before. The minimization resulted 
in the following figure.7 
 
 
                                                             
6  To add these metric variables to the truth table, categorized variants were included. There 
were two categories of starting polarization and voter distribution’s SD: low (≤ median) and 
high (high: > median). 
7  In addition, the equation of the result is: sOpVEI ∗ ((N୫ୣୢD୍(C୍ + C୍୍)) + (N୦୧୥୦D୍୍୍C୍୍)) 	→
Cons.ஹ.ଽହ∗ Rஹ.଺.  
FFi
gu
re
 8
: C
on
di
tio
nss
 f
or
 a
n 
Ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
th
e 
Ca
bi
ne
t 
Ty
pe
 o
n 
th
e
 
e 
Po
la
riz
at
io
n 
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  196 
Interestingly, there are some substantial differences to Figure 7. First, the pres-
ence (not the absence) of incumbent punishment is necessary for high con-
sistency. This change depends on its two different impacts within the model. 
On the one hand, this parameter led to a decreasing correlation, but on the 
other, its presence is necessary for a polarizing dynamic. Hence, it hinders the 
occurrence of a very strong correlation, but results in a centrifugal push. Fur-
thermore, the non-appearance of policy-seeking goals is also necessary, be-
cause polarizing dynamics are often hindered by a party’s non-responsiveness 
in the case of (partial) policy-seeking parties.  
This time, both types of limited contestation were part of the explanatory 
configuration. In addition, a high voter polarization but low starting polariza-
tion creates the preconditions for a polarizing dynamic. In summary, center 
cabinets in contrast to wing cabinets lead to a centrifugal dynamic on the con-
ditions (1) of an unpolarized party system, but polarized electorate, (2) a medi-
um or high number of parties as well as (3) incumbent punishment in combina-
tion with limited contestation. The distribution of the competition dynamic 
within runs of these parameter configurations revealed exactly the theoretical 
effect of the government-opposition patterns that we initially discussed. 
Finally, we tested the influence of some cabinet characteristics on the effect 
size. This analysis referred to a preliminary discussion outlined in the political 
science literature. Commonly, the effect is ascribed to surplus coalitions.8 
However, does the electoral size of the cabinet also matter?  
To test presumptions about the characteristics of the cabinet, three cabinet 
attributes were separately added to the explanatory configuration (see Figure 
8): (1) The presence of a coalition of parties or a one-party cabinet, (2) whether 
the cabinet is oversized (this includes all cabinets with a summed vote share of 
at least 0.6), and (3) whether the cabinet loses votes within the run. 
Table 6 shows that a coalition’s electoral size and the number of cabinet par-
ties are more or less irrelevant. The cabinet type influences the dynamic inde-
pendent of these characteristics. In particular, the missing effect of the existing 
coalition might seem to be paradoxical because limited intra-cabinet contesta-
tion presupposes more than one party. However, the main reason behind the 
interaction effect of limited contestation and cabinet type is not cooperation 
within the cabinet. The cause of the effect is the impact on the opposition. 
Limited contestation hinders oppositional opportunities within office-seeking 
strategies. This constraint is especially enhanced when a center cabinet is pre-
sent. In turn, the opposition’s lack of office-seeking utility leads to extreme 
positioning and then to increasing polarization. 
                                                             
8  We us the term of “surplus coalition” to describe a coalition with a huge majority. 
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Table 6: The Impact of a Cabinet’s Characteristics 
Figure 8 … … * is a coalition? … * is an oversized cabinet? 
… * is a cabinet that 
lost votes? 
Correlation1 0.614 (+0.037) 0.581 (+0.004) 0.764 (+0.187) 
Consistency1 0.994 (0.000) 0.994 (0.000) 1.000 (+0.006) 
Coverage1 0.661 (+0.056) 0.613 (+0.008) 0.908 (+0.303) 
1Correlation means the correlation between cabinet type and polarization dynamic within the 
parameter configuration. In addition, the consistency and coverage describe the consistency 
(or coverage) of the cabinet type as a sufficient condition for an increase in polarization. 
Furthermore, the number in parentheses is the difference compared to the original configura-
tion (Figure 8). 
 
On the contrary, adding a cabinet’s loss of support to the configuration enhanc-
es the consistency and correlation. Here, the consistency amounts to one. 
Hence, all runs with a center cabinet produce centrifugal dynamics. This in-
sight shows the reason behind the deviant cases in Figure 8. All repetitions with 
center cabinets and a centripetal dynamic are simulation runs with a center 
cabinet that was electorally successful in spite of penalization by voters. 
In sum, the ABM shows that government-opposition patterns shape polari-
zation in the theoretically expected way. In particular, the mechanism of lim-
ited contestation explains this macro-level dependency. However, the complete 
explanation of a centrifugal push by center cabinets is more complex. The 
outlined results suggest that the cabinet in combination with limited contesta-
tion, non-moderate vote-seeking incentives (e.g., a polarized electorate), and 
voters’ punishment is a causal chain that explains increasing polarization.  
6. The Example of a Hypothetical German Election 
Furthermore, we illustrate the outlined mechanism by one example. Here, we 
show and describe a specific simulation sequence. For the example, we choose 
a six party system based on a hypothetical federal election in Germany.9 How-
ever, this example is neither a forecast nor a test of the mechanism. We simply 
want to point out the causal chain of our previous analysis. The party positions 
are based on the CHES expert survey of 2014 (Bakker et al. 2015)10 and we 
                                                             
9  The article was finalized before the parliamentary elections in September 2017.  
10  The scale is adjusted via the multiplication by the factor of ten. 
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calibrate the voter distribution as well as the distribution of the non-policy 
factor referring to recent polls. Our example contains the following scenario11: 
Table 7: Parties of the Example* 
Party Abbreviation Vote Share Position 
Christian Democratic Union of 
Germany and Christian Social Union 
CDU/CSU, 
or: Union 41.1% 59.2 
Social Democratic Party of Germany SPD 25.7% 37.7 
The Left Left 8.6% 12.3 
Alliance 90/The Greens Green 10.4% 36.2 
Free Democratic Party FDP 6.4% 65.4 
Alternative for Germany AfD 7.8% 89.2 
*The position of the Union is the mean position of the Christian Democratic Union and the 
Christian Social Union. 
 
Furthermore, we vary the formed coalition after the election in four ways: (1) 
the continuation of the current surplus, center coalition of SPD and Union, (2) a 
right, center coalition of Union and FDP, (3) a left-wing coalition of the Left, 
Greens, and SPD and (4) a right-wing coalition of the AfD, FDP, and Union. 
Of course, both wing coalitions are not likely, because neither the Left nor the 
AfD are considered as potential coalition partners by the other actors. Never-
theless, both parties would be necessary to form the ideal type of a wing coali-
tion. The point of interest is not the realism of this specific scenario. We want 
to illustrate the mechanism by this admittedly rather hypothetical example. The 
starting positions of all parties and the remaining parameter configuration are 
identical between all runs with the exception of the coalition: 
                                                             
11  The NetLogo-File of the example can be downloaded from our project homepage 
<www.pruf.de/dfg-projekt-opposition>, Accessed January 17, 2018). The exact parameter 
configuration is the following: Iterations = 50, random seed = 706242532, information ca-
pacity = 1, number of parties = 6, vote-seeking weight = 0.333, office-seeking weight = 
0.333, policy-seeking weight = 0.333, limited contestation of type II, a unimodal voter dis-
tribution with a standard deviation of 19 and 10000 voters, a biased distribution of the 
non-policy factor (type IV) with a non-policy weight of 5 and, finally, a present punishment 
of incumbents with an weight of 5 (for an overview of all model parameters, see Table 1). 
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Figure 9: The Starting Point of the Exemplary Runs*  
 
* Each circle in combination with its character represents one party. The filling reveals party’s 
status. Cabinet parties are filled dark gray in contrast to opposition parties. 
 
The calibration of the properties of the electorate creates an advantage for the 
SPD and Union regarding the distribution of the non-policy factor within the 
moderate electorate. Thus, more voters of the center identify with these both 
parties giving them an edge to win. This advantage is somewhat stronger for 
the Union. The FDP and Green party exhibit an identification bonus by few 
voters around the left and right wing, which represents their core voters. On the 
contrary, the Left and AfD especially win votes because of their distance to the 
other parties. This scenario is created by the calibration and not by empirical 
data. Furthermore, all parties pursue policy-, office-, and vote-seeking goals to 
the same extent. The coalition cooperates and avoids any contestation (type II). 
Lastly, the coalition is evaluated negatively by the voters and, as consequence, 
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punished by the electorate due to a small handicap. These conditions are identi-
cal between all three runs.  
The key result of the exemplary runs are the varying patterns of polarization. 
While both wing coalitions lead to a centrifugal trend and a lowering polariza-
tion, both center coalitions have the opposite impact, but the surplus type has a 
more centrifugal impact. 
Figure 10: The Polarization Dynamics 
 
The differing levels of polarization are caused by the government-opposition 
patterns. Within the run of the surplus, center coalition, the Social Democrats 
orient themselves towards the center and contest the Green party. The Left 
stays at its position. A similar pattern can be observed on the right wing. The 
ideological center is not contested in this simulation run. The other center coa-
lition formed by the Union and the FDP also initiates an increasing polariza-
tion. However, this push is weaker for two reasons: First, the SPD contests the 
Union at the center and therefore has no increasing effect on the polarization 
level. Second, because the FDP has a lower vote share than the Union, their 
movement towards the right wing is less relevant for the polarization. On the 
contrary, wing coalitions reduce ideological differences within its group and 
contest the ideological center. In response to that, the opposition parties also 
move towards the center. Inversely, these patterns can be observed under both 
types of wing cabinets. The positioning of the parties on the left-right dimen-
sion in the last iteration is outlined by the following figure: 
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Figure 11: The Output of the Fiftieth Iteration* 
 
* Each circle in combination with its character represents one party. The filling reveals a party’s 
status. Cabinet parties are filled dark gray in contrast to opposition parties. 
 
Our parameter configuration of the simulation model allows a prototypical 
demonstration of the effect. However, different variations of the parameters can 
lead to a lowered effect of the cabinet type. Here, we want to discuss some of 
the crucial modeling decisions. Allowing partial contestation within the coali-
tion weakens the mechanism. Referring to our example, we can easily argue 
that the SPD and Union only cooperate to  certain extent. This consideration 
would lower the polarizing effect of the surplus, center coalition, because both 
parties would not abandon the center. Additionally, the wing coalition induces 
a less centripetal effect under a partial contestation. Here, the Left and AfD 
would position themselves further away from the center. Also, a higher policy-
seeking priority of the AfD and Left would alternatively prevent a movement 
towards the center. 
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  202 
On the contrary, two factors can enhance the effect of the coalition type. 
First, three parties in a center coalition lead to a more polarizing trend, e.g. a 
coalition of Union, SPD, and FDP. If the FDP – as part of the coalition – posi-
tions itself more to the center, the Union will win the right wing of the elec-
torate by a non-moderate positioning because of its identification advantage 
against the AfD. Regarding the scenario of a Union-SPD coalition, the FDP 
and its core voters prevent such a move. Furthermore, the normal distribution 
of the voters provides only very few vote-seeking incentives for a non-
moderate positioning. In contrast, a bimodal voter distribution would change 
this incentive structure and enhance the polarizing trend of the center coalition. 
Thus, these hypothetical examples outline the impact of the mechanism. Fi-
nally, we discuss the implication of our results in the next section. 
7.  Discussion 
Currently, the literature on party system polarization and on party positioning 
talk past each other. We demonstrate in this article how an ABM is suitable to 
combine both literature branches in order to generate a complete macro-micro-
macro-explanation of party system polarization. Referring to the classical work 
of Sartori (1976), who points out the importance of the cabinet type on party 
system dynamics, we identify two basic mechanisms: limited contestation 
between and incumbent’s punishment. 
Referring to the outlined model, the impact of cabinet type on the party sys-
tem’s polarization rests upon the structuring of parties’ interaction patterns. In 
particular, limited contestation can explain the centrifugal push by center cabi-
nets. Due to the cooperation of cabinet partners, the opposition has no real 
chance to enter the government. This results in a reduction of oppositional 
office-seeking opportunities for opposition parties and hence rather extreme 
positioning. 
In addition, a polarized electorate that is disappointed by the government’s 
policy ensures the electoral success of this oppositional strategy. As a conse-
quence, the polarization increases and a competition of polarized pluralism 
arises. In the same competitive situation, a wing cabinet could prevent such a 
centrifugal push, because of three facts: (1) the disappointed voter has a mod-
erate alternative, (2) the crucial votes to replace the current government are 
located in the ideological center for the opposition regardless of the electorate’s 
preference distribution, and (3) the opposition’s accession to governmental 
power is possible. In consequence, this opportunity crucially shapes the strate-
gic calculus of the opposition. 
The ABM allows us to deeply analyze the complex and dynamic patterns of 
the party competition model. Furthermore, the test of the explanatory mecha-
nism provides a possible micro-foundation for a common and established theo-
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retical framework in the party system literature. However, the question is 
whether this improvement of our knowledge of the effect of government-
opposition patterns is relevant – or is the presented micro-foundation itself the 
final goal? 
Of course, one might argue that the assurance of the theory’s logical con-
sistency, the clarification of the causal chain, and the unveiling of (thus far) 
implicit axioms are benefits on their own. However, we additionally argue that 
the most important feature of the agent-based micro-foundation is the precision 
of our theoretical expectation based on the framework. The presented results 
have some crucial practical implications. The original hypothesis based on 
Sartori’s (1976) typology is that a bilateral opposition and occupied ideological 
center lead to polarized competition. This argument implies an expectation of a 
more-or-less (deterministic) linear effect. A center cabinet is sufficient for the 
occurrence of polarization and a wing cabinet is sufficient for the presence of a 
centripetal shift. Based on the simulation results, we decisively modified this 
hypothesis. The final explanatory configuration (Figure 12) makes the causal 
structure clear: Center cabinets are an insufficient but necessary part of a condi-
tion, which is itself unnecessary but sufficient (or an INUS condition; Mackie 
1965) for the occurrence of a polarizing dynamic. Within the outlined configu-
ration – presence of limited contestation, a medium or high number of parties, a 
polarized electorate, and so on – a center cabinet is necessary so that this con-
figuration leads to a centrifugal push. Furthermore, a center cabinet lacking 
these boundary conditions does not influence the competition dynamic in any 
way. Therefore, the evaluation of the empirical covariance depends on the 
chosen hypothesis. We depict the potential difference with the help of Venn 
diagrams in Figure 12.  
Based on the original hypothesis, the overlap of the sets of center cabinets 
and polarizing dynamics represents the theory’s confirmatory cases. The theory 
would be perfectly confirmed if both sets were identical. Here, the explained 
variance between both variables would be one. In contrast, the number of times 
both sets do not overlap represents the deviating cases (for example, center 
cabinets that lead to a centripetal dynamic or polarizing wing cabinets). In this 
hypothetical example, we would clearly reject the original hypothesis and 
would actually find a negative correlation. Therefore, we would reject the 
theory’s accuracy and assume a centrifugal effect by wing cabinets.  
On the contrary, the empirically interesting sets change based on the adjust-
ed hypothesis (right part of Figure 12). Here, we assume that the center cabi-
nets are in an INUS condition. Therefore, the confirmation is the overlap of the 
entire sufficient condition (Figure 8 combined with center cabinets) and the set 
of centrifugal dynamics. In contrast, the deviating cases are the overlap of the 
center cabinets and boundary conditions only. Here, the proportion of confirm-
atory cases would be higher and we would confirm the empirical hypotheses. 
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Figure 12: Confirmation and Rejection of the Original and Adjusted Hypotheses  
 
This hypothetical example illustrates the impressive change in the evaluation of 
empirical patterns of covariance due to the micro-foundation. Thus, developing 
the micro-foundation of a macro-level theory is a crucial step within the re-
search design. The ABM method is thereby a powerful tool to analyze theoreti-
cally complex and dynamic social systems with a potentially strong influence 
on the subsequent empirical research.  
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Appendix 
Table 8: The Correlation within Different Parameter Configurations (Exemplary 
Extract of the Dataset) 
N
um
ber of parties 
Lim
ited contestation 
O
ffice-seeking w
eight 
Policy-seeking w
eight 
Voter distribution 
Incum
bents’ punishing
N
on-policy distribution
Inform
ation level 
Correlation 
N
um
ber of runs 
Low No No No Bimodal Yes Type IV Low -0.12 2266 
Medium No No No Unimodal No Type III Low -0.02 3398 
Medium Type I No No Unimodal No Type IV Low 0.00 1953 
Medium No Yes Yes Bimodal No Type III High 0.02 3854 
Medium Type II No Yes Bimodal Yes Type I Low 0.24 2025 
Low Type II Yes Yes Bimodal No Type III Low 0.67 2332 
Medium Type I No No Bimodal No Type II Low -0.01 1945 
High Type I No Yes Unimodal No Type I Low -0.01 1975 
Medium No No No Unimodal Yes Type II High 0.05 2260 
High No No No Unimodal Yes Type IV High -0.10 2307 
Medium Type II Yes Yes Unimodal No Type II High 0.57 2313 
Low No Yes No Unimodal Yes Type III Low -0.09 2278 
[1152 cases included in the entire dataset] 
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Figure 13: The Missing Centrifugal Push by Center Cabinets 
 
Figure 14: Boxplot of the Polarization Dynamics in Different Contexts 
 
*Outliers (grey area) greater than 1.5 or lower than -1.5 are excluded in the plot. In conse-
quence, 145,665 of 2.5 million cases are represented in the plot.  
 
